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Abstract 
Many low- and middle-income countries suffer from a lack of medium-sized companies, 
which tend to be the main creators of higher-income employment as well as the motors of 
innovation and economic diversification. The chief reason is that few micro and small 
enterprises are able to upgrade, that is, grow and become medium-sized through 
innovation. There is extensive literature offering manifold explanations, but no conclusion 
has been offered yet as to what the most important factors are: entrepreneur or firm 
characteristics; personal or business networks; or the business environment. This article 
contributes towards filling this gap on the basis of three extensive empirical case studies 
on Egypt, India and the Philippines. It argues that the entrepreneur matters much more 
than recent literature would lead us to believe. Due to chronic imperfections in the 
business environment, entrepreneurs in all three countries face similar upgrading 
constraints: lack of finance, skilled workers, market information, technology and security. 
Some are able to upgrade despite the constraints, but they have to struggle to sustain their 
success. The few that succeed in both regards have taken it upon themselves to develop 
effective coping strategies. In all three countries, they use similar strategies, in which they 
tend to benefit from: above-average financial, social and human capital; motivation; risk-
readiness; and a willingness to invest in human resources, market research as well as 
research and development. As a result, standard reforms for the improvement of the 
business environment are certainly important but unlikely to translate into the upgrading 
of a much larger number of MSEs. Inequality of opportunity is going to prevail unless 
governments are willing to create a level playing field through the provision of quality 
education and training, human resource development, access to markets and finance, and 
rule of law for all.  
 JEL Classification: D20; L10; L20; L66; L67; L86; M10; M20; M50
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1 Introduction 
Most low- and middle-income countries are characterised by a phenomenon that is often 
called the “missing middle”: they have many micro and small enterprises (MSEs) but only 
few medium-sized ones, and hardly any of the small ones are linked to larger companies. 
In particular, firms in the medium-sized segment are rare, which is at least partly due to 
difficulties that small enterprises face in growing and transforming into medium-sized 
enterprises (Schmitz 1999). Above all, this phenomenon constitutes a problem because 
medium-sized companies create the bulk of higher-quality, higher-wage jobs in many 
countries. Medium-sized companies tend to be the main motors of innovation and 
economic diversification and are the firms that may become able, over time, to export 
their products directly. 
A large strand of – mainly theoretical – literature discusses why only very few MSEs 
manage to upgrade, that is, to innovate and grow. Many factors are suggested: 
entrepreneur characteristics (such as the education and family backgrounds of owners), 
firm characteristics (such as the formality status of the firms and the level of training of 
workers), inter-firm linkages (i.e. the firm’s integration into value chains or clusters) as 
well as elements of the business environment (such as regulation, trade policy, the 
provision of finance, the availability of business development services (BDSs) and 
infrastructure).  
But the literature does not provide much evidence on the relative importance of these 
factors. This deficit is partly due to the fact that it is difficult to answer the question using 
econometric analysis. Even panel data do not trace the path of many MSEs, because most 
of these are not registered and frequently change their identity. Qualitative case studies are 
a more adequate instrument of research, but their results are not generalisable unless they 
are based on at least medium-sized samples and rigorous techniques of data generation 
and interpretation. This article is therefore based on a hybrid method that combines the 
strengths of qualitative and quantitative methods using medium-sized samples in three 
very distinct countries. 
The article contributes towards filling the gap in the literature. Based on empirical 
research conducted in Egypt, India and the Philippines in 2012, it provides answers to two 
questions: 
– Which constraints are responsible for the fact that upgrading seems to be difficult for 
MSEs in many low- and middle-income countries?  
– Which “success factors” explain the fact that some MSEs manage to upgrade (unlike 
others) despite the general difficulties? 
Using empirical evidence1 from three countries, we argue that the entrepreneur matters 
substantially in enterprise upgrading. Factors such as the education, experience, social 
capital, ambition and risk-readiness of MSE owners are much more decisive for their 
upgrading potential than the bulk of recent literature would lead us to believe. 
                                                            
1  Detailed findings of these three country studies have been published in the following research reports: 
Hampel-Milagrosa (2014); Loewe (2013); Loewe et al. (2013) and Reeg (2013b). 
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Governments should thus pay much more attention than they have in the past to creating a 
level playing field for all entrepreneurs.  
This paper proceeds as follows: the Conceptual Framework in Section 2 presents the 
“Onion Model”, which we developed in order to depict that there are four layers of factors 
influencing enterprise upgrading. Section 3 specifies the objectives of the three-country 
project and explains our methodological considerations towards a cohesive empirical 
research approach. Section 4 presents our findings with regards to the main constraints 
and success factors of enterprise upgrading for entrepreneurs in Egypt, India and the 
Philippines. Section 5 illustrates these findings with showcases of typical upgrading 
strategies of information and communication technology (ICT) companies in India; food 
processors in the Philippines; and textiles and garments producers in Egypt. Section 6 
concludes and offers suggestions for policy recommendations. 
2 Conceptual framework 
In the simplest terms, we define enterprise upgrading as “growth through innovation” – 
that is, innovation that induces an increase in any target variable of entrepreneurs, such as 
the company’s returns, sales, assets or number of employees. The term contains thus both 
a qualitative aspect (innovation) and a quantitative aspect (firm growth). We chose the 
term “upgrading” (normally used only for the qualitative aspect) rather than “graduation” 
(normally used for the quantitative aspect) because there are many reasons why firms may 
be able to grow (market expansion, rapid increase in demand, significant change in price, 
etc.), but we wanted to focus on growth through innovation, which is the only growth 
strategy that entrepreneurs can directly control (i.e. all others depend to some degree on 
external factors). 
A firm can innovate through a variety of ways: the launch of a new or enhanced product 
(product innovation); an improvement in the production process (process innovation); the 
introduction of a new packaging, labelling or marketing method (marketing innovation); 
the engagement of the enterprise in new stages in the value chain (functional innovation); 
or its move to a new sector (sectoral innovation). Innovation in itself, however, does not 
necessarily translate into firm growth. The condition is that the innovation brings 
something new to the relevant market – and not only to the innovating firm – and thereby 
generates an innovation rent. Different strands of literature allude to different factors 
determining whether an enterprise can upgrade (micro-perspective) and whether it is 
generally easy for enterprises in one country or region to upgrade (macro-perspective). 
These factors fall into four broad categories: entrepreneur characteristics, enterprise 
characteristics, networks (both personal and professional) and the business environment 
(see the Onion Model in Figure 1). 
At the core of the Onion Model are entrepreneur characteristics. Some authors refer to 
human capital (including work experience and training) (Mead / Liedholm 1998; Eifert / 
Gelb / Ramachandran 2005), entrepreneur age (Cortes / Berry / Ishaq 1987), gender 
(McPherson / Liedholm 1996) as well as motivation (de Mel / McKenzie / Woodruff 
2008) and risk-taking ability (Szirmai / Naudé / Goedhuys 2011) as important factors for 
enterprise upgrading. 
Which 
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survey, we included the results of focus group discussions and expert interviews in our 
analysis. We tried to use econometric techniques to support our qualitative findings 
wherever possible and to the degree that our own, or other, data allowed us. Fully 
representative panel data, however, were only available for Egypt from two rounds of the 
Egypt Investment Climate Survey (EICS) conducted in 2004 and 2008, which we used for 
logit estimates.  
The main objective of the research was to learn from the experience of successful 
“upgraders” and to compare them with “non-upgraders”, that is, stagnating MSEs. For this 
purpose, we 
– compared upgraders and non-upgraders with regard to key characteristics that could 
explain differences in the propensity to upgrade; 
– asked MSE owners about their perceptions of the main determinants of upgrading: 
constraints and success factors; and 
– interviewed MSE owners also on their development in order to trace back their 
upgrading efforts – whether successful or not. 
In all three countries, the definition of MSEs was based on the number of employees. We 
used this indicator for firm size – and also for firm growth – for pragmatic reasons: it 
turned out to be the only variable for which entrepreneurs provided reliable reports. 
Particular thresholds were defined based on respective country contexts. To be classified 
as upgraders, the enterprises had to meet the following criteria: 
– Quantitative criteria (for company growth): (i) Enterprises must have grown by at least 
10 per cent per year on average during the last 5–10 years. (ii) They must have started 
from below a country-specific threshold in terms of the number of regular employees 
5–10 years ago (they must have been a micro or small enterprise at that time) and 
grown beyond that same threshold in the meantime until they were interviewed in 2012. 
– Qualitative criterion (for innovation): (i) Enterprises must have documented efforts in 
innovation (improvements in products, production processes (technology upgrading) 
or ways of organising production). (ii) And they must have grown substantially faster 
than their respective competitors (again measured in number of employees) in order to 
make sure that their growth was not merely due to external effects, such as growth in 
demand, but to innovation, that is, the introduction of something that was new to the 
market and has therefore created an innovation rent. 
In order to identify a sufficient number of enterprises that would fit these criteria, we 
adopted purposive sampling techniques. However, we had to combine different ones 
because each such technique produces a selection bias, and we wanted to reduce the effect 
of these biases on our total samples. Therefore, we selected a quarter of our interview 
partners, on average, randomly from official enterprise registries or near-to-representative 
lists (such as telephone books or yellow pages), roughly the same number based on 
recommendations of experts and lead firms, and the remainder by walking the streets 
within and outside of geographical production clusters and requesting interviews on site 
with professionals working in MSEs. 
Which factors determine the upgrading of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises? 
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With regard to the sector selection, we made sure that chosen economic sectors showed a 
high proportion of MSEs and also contributed considerably to the gross domestic product 
of the respective country. Further, we made sure that there would be an overlap of at least 
two sectors between the chosen country cases, resulting in easier comparability across 
countries. On the basis of these criteria, we selected the ICT sector in Egypt and India; the 
leather and footwear sector in India and the Philippines; the food processing sector in Egypt 
and the Philippines; and the textiles and garments sector in all three countries (Table 1).  
Table 1: Cross-country sample composition 
 Egypt India Philippines 
Total 80 93 112 
Upgraders 
Non-upgraders 
40 
40 
42 
51 
21 
91 
Textiles and garments 
Leather and footwear 
Food processing 
ICTs 
43 
 
26 
11 
29 
37 
 
27 
31 
32 
49 
 
Formal at start 
Informal at start 
59 
21 
28 
65 
30 
82 
Female owner 
Male owner 
15 
65 
4 
89 
58 
54 
Source: Hampel-Milagrosa (2014), Loewe et al. (2013) and Reeg (2013b) 
4 Findings 
Despite apparent differences between the framework conditions of MSEs in Egypt, India 
and the Philippines, our findings manifest a high degree of consistency. 
The first finding is that MSEs in Egypt, India and the Philippines perceive very similar 
constraints to upgrading: (i) their owners’ deficits in education and experience, (ii) the 
lack of – or the high turnover of – trained workers, (iii) difficulties in accessing finance, 
(iv) the lack of market information and (v) deficits in the rule of law. These factors were 
mentioned most frequently when MSE owners were asked about their five key challenges 
for innovation and growth. In Egypt, for example, 63 per cent of all interviewed MSE 
owners complained about deficits in law enforcement in their country, while 58 
considered the lack of – or the high turnover of – well-trained and motivated workers as 
being one of their five major obstacles, whereas 33 per cent pointed to access to finance, 
27 per cent to the lack of marketing support, 18 per cent to high taxes and only 14 per cent 
to their own levels of education and work experience (Loewe 2013; Loewe et al. 2013, 
Annex Tables A11a–A12).  
It may not be surprising that these factors influence MSE upgrading. Also, it is not 
astonishing that many entrepreneurs attribute their difficulties more to external factors 
(especially the business environment) than to their own (lack of) qualities. However, note 
that only very few respondents pointed to factors that were highlighted as barriers to 
upgrading in earlier studies – such as, for example, enterprise size, age or location; 
informality; the owner’s gender; or trade and monetary policies. 
Aimée Hampel-Milagrosa / Markus Loewe / Caroline Reeg 
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The business climate was mentioned as a constraint to MSE development in many 
interviews – especially interactions between state and businesses such as licensing, 
taxation, inspections and governmental efforts to safeguard fair competition. However, 
most of the serious constraints MSE owners were referring to were due to deficits in law 
enforcement rather than over-regulation, red tape and the costs of procedures (such as 
licensing and customs) in terms of time and money. These costs matter for entrepreneurs, 
but their main problem is that they cannot assess these costs in advance, and they do not 
know what the outcome of the procedure will be. Across the three countries, public officials 
have significant discretionary leeway in the interpretation of laws and guidelines for MSEs. 
As a result, MSEs often invest a lot of time, money and effort without knowing whether this 
will suffice or whether the applications, requests and registrations will ever be approved. 
MSEs are particularly vulnerable to such weaknesses in the law because they lack the 
financial reserves and the connections to influential politicians, as compared to larger firms.3 
Deficits in access to finance were also mentioned as a main constraint to upgrading, but 
they are not always (only) due to supply-side factors. In Egypt, India and the Philippines, 
deficits do appear to prevail in the provision of adequate MSE finance; however, for many 
MSEs, access to finance is mainly constrained by demand-side factors: (i) lack of financial 
literacy (knowledge on repayment conditions and lending costs), (ii) lack of awareness 
and market information, (iii) inability to design and formulate a business plan, (iv) unclear 
business ideas and/or (v) unclear / exaggerated expectations.  
A second finding of our research is that upgrading is possible – at least for some MSEs – 
despite all the constraints: we identified more upgraders than we had initially expected, 
even when we were not explicitly looking for them. In Egypt, for example, a total of 59 
firms were selected by random sampling methods (i.e. from the registries, from telephone 
books or the like, or by walking the streets) and 29 of them turned out, in fact, to be 
upgraders. All in all, in terms of the number of employees, half of all the companies in our 
Egyptian sample grew by at least 50 per cent between 2007 and 2012 (see Figure 2).  
However, we also identified a large number of companies that had been considerably larger in 
the past but that had recently contracted in size.4 The number of firms that grew between 2007 
and 2012 was almost equal to the number of firms that contracted – in all sectors and size 
brackets (see Figure 2). This phenomenon (whereby many enterprises are moving up while 
many others are moving down) is well-known and commonly referred to as “churning”. It also 
includes the birth of many new companies and the death of many older ones, and it therefore 
impacts the resulting number of medium-sized companies in an economy. However, as long 
as the number of firms growing exceeds the number of firms contracting, the group of 
medium-sized companies can expand. Churning may have occurred in Egypt between 2002 
and 2007, since quite a number of the companies we interviewed had grown significantly 
during those years, and only a few had contracted. Admittedly, the evidence is weak because a 
similarly large number of companies might have contracted during that same period but are no 
longer around to tell us what happened. In any case, the shortage of medium-sized enterprises 
across samples from the three countries is not only due to the difficulties that small firms have 
with upgrading, but it could also be attributed to the difficulties that upgraded firms face in 
sustaining their growth over longer periods of time. 
                                                            
3  Cf. Loewe (2013). 
4  All contracting companies were classified, just like stagnating companies, as non-upgraders. 
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if they have personal wealth. And they can function despite deficits in the rule of law if 
they are ready to accept high risks. Likewise, on-the-job-training helps them to cope with 
workers lacking proper vocational education. 
In addition, factors such as the social origin of MSE owners, their social networks9 and 
their membership in business associations seem to matter as well in India and the 
Philippines – but less so in Egypt. Access to land for production and market 
diversification (especially towards export markets) emerged as a success factor in Egypt 
and in India – but less so in the Philippines, where portfolio diversification seems to be 
more important. BDSs were found to be a success factor in Egypt, whereas we have no 
such evidence for India or the Philippines (which may be due, however, to the limited 
outreach and quality of such services in the other two countries) (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Success factors: What makes an upgrader? 
 Egypt India Philippines 
Entrepreneur  
characteristics 
• Human capital 
(education, experience 
and international 
exposure of owner) 
• Individual / family 
wealth 
• Motivation  
• Readiness to take risks 
• Corporate governance 
• Human capital 
(education, experience 
and international 
exposure of owner) 
• Individual / family 
wealth 
• Motivation 
• Social origin (caste and 
business family identity) 
• Human capital 
(education, experience 
and international 
exposure of owner) 
• Individual / family 
wealth 
• Motivation 
• Social origin (region) 
• Readiness to take risks 
Firm  
characteristics 
• HRD / workers’ welfare 
• Spending on R&D and 
market research 
• Market diversification 
• HRD / workers’ welfare 
• Spending on R&D and 
market research 
• Market diversification 
• Location (access to land, 
electricity and workers) 
• HRD / workers’ welfare 
• Spending on R&D and 
market research 
• Portfolio diversification 
Personal 
networks 
 • Social networks • Social networks 
Professional  
networks 
• Integration in GVCs 
(but few cases!) 
• Integration in GVCs 
• Membership in a 
business organisation 
• Integration in GVCs 
• Membership in a 
business organisation 
Business  
environment 
• Access to credit 
• Access to land, 
electricity and road 
infrastructure 
• Access to business  
development services 
• Access to credit 
• Access to land and  
electricity 
• Access to credit 
• Political stability  
(notably in the South) 
Source: Hampel-Milagrosa (2014), Loewe et al. (2013) and Reeg (2013b) 
                                                            
9  Social networks are particularly important for MSE owners in the Philippines for getting access to finance, 
advice, know-how, emotional support, unpaid labour, connections and support for child care. The results for 
India are somewhat ambiguous, whereas social networks seem to play a much less important role in Egypt: 
at least for the three sectors that we studied there, we did not find any evidence that differences between 
entrepreneurs regarding social capital have any impact on their likelihood to upgrade. However, the situation 
might be different in other economic sectors such as tourism and construction, where there is much 
anecdotal evidence about the importance of wasţa (connections) for doing business. 
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This, our third finding, is based on the use of three research tools, which point to the same 
variables as major factors behind enterprise upgrading in Egypt, India and the Philippines. 
(i) Upgraders across the three countries were asked in an open question how they had 
managed to grow despite all the obstacles, whereas non-upgraders were asked why other 
companies were more successful in upgrading despite the fact that they all faced similar 
obstacles. In Egypt, MSE owners were further asked to select what they perceived to be the 
five main reasons for differences in the upgrading success of MSEs in their country from a 
closed list of about 30 factors taken from the four layers of the Onion Model. The result was 
that in all three countries, a clear majority of upgraders and non-upgraders attributed 
differences in the individual likelihood of firms to upgrade mainly to entrepreneur 
characteristics. And, according to our interviewees in Egypt, India and the Philippines, the 
most important factors of success in upgrading include the human capital of company 
owners (education, experience and international exposure) and their ambition / motivation, 
followed by their readiness to take risks, their investment in marketing, their access to credit 
and their HRD efforts. In addition, smart corporate governance in Egypt and the strategic 
use of social and professional relations by entrepreneurs in India and the Philippines were 
also found to be success factors (see Table 3 for the results from our Egyptian sample). 
Table 3: Main factors of success for MSE upgrading according to MSE owners from Egypt 
 Answers to 
our open 
question 
Items selected 
from a closed 
list of answers 
Answers to 
either of the 
two questions 
Entrepreneur characteristics 
Education, experience and international exposure of owner 8% 49% 51% 
Ambition of owner 18% 43% 51% 
Readiness of owner to take risks 5% 25% 27% 
Gender of owner 0% 4% 4% 
Firm characteristics 
Investment in marketing 14% 10% 20% 
Corporate governance 14% 3% 17% 
Training of, incentives for or participation of workers 16% 0% 16% 
Specialisation 7% 0% 7% 
Rationalisation 5% 0% 5% 
Formality status 0% 4% 4% 
Personal and professional networks 
Cooperation with other firms 0% 6% 6% 
Business environment 
Access to finance 12% 9% 19% 
Bribery and favouritism 6% 0% 6% 
Access to BDSs 0% 6% 6% 
Access to insurance 0% 3% 3% 
Source:  own data collected for Loewe et al. (2013 Tables A13–A14) 
(ii) Upgraders were compared with comparable non-upgraders with regard to these same 
variables (e.g. level of education, formality status, access to credit, membership in business 
organisations, etc., see Table 4). The differences between the two groups were particularly 
Aimée Hampel-Milagrosa / Markus Loewe / Caroline Reeg 
10  German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
significant regarding the levels of formal education, international exposure, investment in 
HRD, investment in marketing, access to credit and access to BDSs (which may, however, 
include credit as well). Differences between upgraders and non-upgraders in having 
inherited their firms from their families and in “bribing when necessary” are also significant 
but contradictory. These factors seem to have a positive effect on upgrading in India and the 
Philippines but a negative one in Egypt – or the correlation is due to reverse causality in one 
or more of the three countries. Formalisation and membership in business organisations was 
found to also correlate positively with upgrading, but the in-depth part of our interviews 
with MSE owners gave us the impression that this is indeed due to reverse causality. 
Table 4: Correlation of MSE upgrading with selected independent factors 
Proportion  of  
companies with the 
following  
characteristics 
Egypt India Philippines 
Up-
grader 
Non-
up-
grader 
Signi-
ficanc
e 
(t-test) 
Up-
grader 
Non-
up-
grader 
Signi-
ficanc
e 
(t-test) 
Up-
grader 
Non-
up-
grader 
Signi-
ficanc
e 
(t-test) 
Entrepreneur characteristics 
Female owner 28% 10% ** 5% 4%  66% 48%  
Owner has university 
degree 
80% 63% * 83% 47% *** 81% 24% *** 
Owner has had  
international exposure 
70% 48% ** 52% 20% *** 62% 4% *** 
Company was inherited 18% 28%  57% 39% ** 86% 26% *** 
Firm characteristics 
More than 20% of 
workers have enjoyed 
formal training 
25% 5% ** n/a n/a n/a 100% 2% *** 
Company is 
formalised 
93% 75% ** 100% 39% *** 100% 15% *** 
Invests in market  
information 
n/a n/a n/a 52% 22% *** 90% 37% *** 
Personal and professional networks 
Is member of a 
business association 
28% 18%  86% 27% *** 81% 6% *** 
Is located in a cluster 23% 18%  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Cooperates with 
similar companies 
48% 33%  31% 14% ** 95% 44% *** 
Business environment 
Has received BDSs 
from the state or NGOs 
33% 5% *** 48% 24% ** 71% 62%  
Has received a bank 
loan 
13% 3% * 60% 12% *** 5% 2%  
Has ever bribed 40% 55% * 74% 35% *** 33% 90% *** 
Has problems with 
power supply 
20% 20%  71% 47% ** n/a n/a n/a 
Has problems with 
transportation 
48% 43%  10% 22%  19% 31%  
*** / ** / * = t-test shows statistical significance at the 1% / 5% / 10% confidence level. 
Source: Hampel-Milagrosa (2014), Loewe et al. (2013) and Reeg (2013b) 
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(iii) Panel data from two rounds of representative enterprise surveys conducted in Egypt 
in 2004 and 2008 were used for a logit estimate on the impact of selected independent 
variables on the propensity of a firm to upgrade (unfortunately, no panel data are 
available on MSEs in India or the Philippines). The dependent variable was constructed 
as a dummy depending on both innovation and firm growth. Table 5 shows that this 
technique of analysis points mainly to the effects that workers’ training, investment in 
R&D, target-market diversification (share of exported products) and access to credit 
have on upgrading. Considering licensing as the main obstacle for enterprises was also 
found to correlate significantly with the likelihood of an MSE to upgrade, but this 
correlation seems to be positive – at least in Egypt – which would mean that companies 
complaining mainly about problems concerning business licensing do not have much 
reason to be complaining at all: their main problem is minor compared with the 
problems that other enterprises face. 
Our results are ambiguous with regard to the gender of owners, formality and the age of 
MSEs. 
We did not find evidence that female ownership negatively impacts MSE upgrading – at 
least in Egypt and in the Philippines. It is true that most MSEs are still run by males. But 
the share of women entrepreneurs was even somewhat higher (but not statistically 
significant) among upgraders than among non-upgraders in both countries (Tables 3 and 
5). In addition, most women entrepreneurs interviewed in Egypt and the Philippines 
stated that being female was an advantage rather than a disadvantage for their business. 
According to them, the low number of women entrepreneurs is due to negative notions 
about women’s participation in economic activities rather than objective constraints. 
However, once a woman runs an enterprise, she gains the same level of respect as a man. 
In India, by contrast, we cannot say for sure, as we were not able to interview more than 
four female entrepreneurs. This may hint to uneven opportunities for men and women as 
entrepreneurs, but it can also be due to a gendered selection bias. In-depth interviews 
suggest that some sectors (e.g. leather and footwear) seem to be inaccessible for women 
entrepreneurs in general.  
For informality, we found a statistically significant correlation with upgrading across the 
three countries. However, this correlation is probably due to reverse causality, that is, 
informal companies that had grown or decided to grow had sooner or later decided to 
formalise. Many owners of formal and informal MSEs stressed that formalisation did not 
constitute a barrier to growth. Informality would thus be a deliberate choice of most micro 
and small entrepreneurs, because they perceive the disadvantages of formality to outweigh 
its advantages. Once companies upgrade, they reconsider their formality status and often 
gradually formalise when they believe that the advantages of formality have gained in 
importance. 
The age of an MSE is obviously correlated with its likelihood to upgrade, but this 
correlation is non-linear, and age is not the independent variable in the correlation. After 
their founding, MSEs must first get settled and organised; normally, they do not yet have 
the capacity to expand substantially. The likelihood of upgrading is greatest after this 
start-up phase, which may last one to four years, but then diminishes steadily over time: if 
MSEs have the potential to upgrade, they will try to do so as soon as possible rather 
than wait. 
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Table 5: Logit estimations for “upgrader” dummy as the dependent variable for MSEs in Egypt – based 
on panel data from two rounds of the Egypt Investment Climate Survey (2004 and 2008) 
Independent variables 1 2 3 4 
Female owner (dummy) 0.225
(0.324)
Single shareholder (dummy) -0.00426 
(0.00448)
Years of top manager’s experience 0.00516 
(0.0116)
Size of company (total number of employees) -0.000266   
(0.000690)   
On-the-job training for workers available 
(dummy)  0.702** 0.703**   
(0.302) (0.301)   
Has specialised R&D department (dummy)  0.646**  0.576* 
 (0.310)  (0.306)
Independent variables 1 2 3 4 
Use of foreign technology (dummy) 0.257 0.190   
(0.392) (0.400)   
Located in an industrial zone (dummy) 0.336 0.209   
(0.306) (0.312)   
Share of products sold domestically -0.0170*** -0.0164***   
(0.00442) (0.00445)   
Access to external finance (dummy) 0.624* 0.555*   
(0.330) (0.322)   
Access to insurance (dummy) -0.115
(0.306)
Main obstacle is infrastructure (dummy) + 0.372 0.182 
(0.488) (0.478)
Main obstacle is access to labour (dummy) + 0.0125 0.0738 
(0.810) (0.785)
Main obstacle is access to finance (dummy) + 0.217 0.513
(0.542) (0.510)
Main obstacle is illegal competition (dummy) + -0.627 -0.592 
(0.780) (0.771)
Main obstacle is uncertain macro-economic or  
political situation (dummy) + 0.544 0.612* 
(0.379) (0.367)
Main obstacle is corruption (dummy) + -0.0830 0.0296 
(0.601) (0.587)
Main obstacle is business licensing (dummy) + 1.487** 1.498** 
(0.698) (0.662)
Main obstacle is other factor (dummy) + -0.556 -0.551
(0.663) (0.648)
Constant -1.159** -2.261*** -1.361*** -2.545*** 
(0.454) (0.383) (0.485) (0.273)
Observations 625 610 625 628 
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Table 5 (cont.): Logit estimations for “upgrader” dummy as the dependent variable for MSEs 
in Egypt – based on panel data from two rounds of the Egypt Investment Climate 
Survey (2004 and 2008) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** / ** / * = significant at the 1% / 5% / 10% confidence level. 
The estimates use data from two rounds of representative EICSs conducted in 2004 and 2008 (Enterprise 
Surveys 2004 / 2008). Each round covered about 1,000 systematically selected enterprises but panel data 
exist for only slightly less than 700 of them because 300 companies had disappeared for unknown reasons 
between 2004 and 2007 and had to be replaced by other ones. 
The “upgrading” dummy variable was constructed from the difference between the data for 2004 and 
2008: it was set as “1” for companies that grew by at least 40 per cent (i.e. 10 per cent per year) in their 
number of employees and also introduced at least one type of innovation; otherwise “0”. 
For the independent variables, we used only data from 2004 in order to control for possible reverse causality. 
+ In models 3 and 4, “Main obstacle is the tax system” is the reference category for the other obstacles. 
Source: Loewe et al. (2013, Annex C) 
Hence, if an MSE does not upgrade during the first five years, it becomes less and less 
likely that it will ever upgrade – unless there is a change in ownership or management. For 
example, in the case of an upgraded family business in India, a change in management – 
in most cases the handover of the business from the father to the son – led to considerable 
growth dynamics in the firm. 
Our fourth finding is that upgrading requires a combination of success factors for most 
MSEs in the three countries. Entrepreneurs find themselves confronted with different 
challenges that must be dealt with simultaneously in order to upgrade. According to the 
results of our interviews, these challenges can be grouped under five main headings: 
obtaining finance; access to labour; markets; technology; and a minimum level of 
reliability / security (see Figure 3).  
However, there are different options for entrepreneurs to address each of these five 
challenges (see Figure 3). Each option is to some extent related to different layers of the 
Onion Model portrayed in Figure 1. Production technology, for example, may be readily 
available for MSEs for free or for sale from the business environment (national innovation 
systems, research institutions, machinery suppliers, etc.). But MSE owners could also be 
very creative and develop their own ideas about how to manufacture their products (which 
would be an entrepreneur characteristic). Or they could set up an R&D department to 
develop a suitable production technology (enterprise characteristic) or acquire the 
necessary know-how from their foreign purchaser (business networks). 
The way in which entrepreneurs combine solutions for each of the five challenges depends 
strongly on their context, because the availability of these “success factors” differs from 
one sector and country to the other. Still, MSEs operating in the same context (country, 
region, sector, etc.) tend to use very similar strategies for mastering each of the five big 
challenges mentioned above, so one could say that a specific combination of success 
factors characterises MSEs of the same kind in a given country. The following section 
presents examples for such kinds of “combinations of success factors”. 
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The fifth finding is that entrepreneur characteristics tend to be the cornerstones of these 
factor combinations. The bulk of MSE owners rely on their own education, work 
experience, international exposure, motivation, risk-readiness and savings for their 
upgrading strategies. The majority of key success factors listed above belongs to the core 
of our Onion Model (see Figure 1). Most of the other key success factors are also 
contingent upon the personalities of entrepreneurs: MSE owners need a certain level of 
education, experience and possibly even international exposure to understand how 
important it is to invest in social networks, R&D, marketing and workers (training, 
provision of incentives, participation in decision-making) and to have a well-framed firm 
strategy (e.g. on market orientation or portfolio diversification). They also need certain 
levels of education and risk-readiness in addition to access to finance in order to be able to 
successfully implement all this. Finally, even access to finance often depends much more 
on demand-side factors (such as the financial literacy of entrepreneurs or their ability to 
draw up a proper business plan) than on supply-side factors (provision of credit by banks 
or other organisations).  
The reason is that, due to chronic imperfections in the business environment of low- and 
middle-income countries, entrepreneurs have to take it upon themselves to compensate for 
the deficits in the system. They must invest their own capital to offset difficulties in 
obtaining credit. They must train their workers on the job to compensate for the low 
quality and limited outreach of the vocational training system. They must be willing and 
able to accept high risks because of severe deficits in the rule of law. And so forth.  
As a consequence, and this is our sixth finding, there is glaring inequality regarding 
opportunities for MSEs to upgrade. The requirements for coping with the chronic 
imperfections in the business environment are unequally distributed across the population. 
Only the most privileged – those who have enough capital, good education, international 
experience, relevant work experience, motivation and enough security to accept risks – are 
able to circumvent structural constraints, whereas the huge majority of less fortunate 
entrepreneurs fail. In other words: the entrepreneur her- / himself makes the difference! 
5 Showcases of successful upgrading strategies 
In the following, we present upgrading trajectories that are typical for MSEs in specific 
sectors of the three examined countries: ICT companies in India, food processors in the 
Philippines and textile and garment producers in Egypt. These three examples showcase 
how upgraders have made use of particular factor combinations to tackle their main 
challenges and developmental constraints. 
Apparently, the central element of all of these combinations of success factors is in the 
very core of the Onion Model presented in Figure 1: entrepreneur characteristics. A large 
number of MSEs in Egypt, India and the Philippines rely heavily on the interactions of a 
well-informed, educated and socially embedded entrepreneur using his own resources as 
well as his own personal networks to compensate for multiple dysfunctions in the outer 
layers of the Onion Model – in particular in the business environment.  
Although this “entrepreneur-driven” upgrading is observed in all three countries, there are, 
in fact, differences between the countries regarding the intensity with which entrepreneurs 
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make effective use of their networks. As a consequence, our seventh and last finding is 
that there are significant differences in the degrees to which MSEs can tap the support of 
their personal and professional networks to help them cope. Entrepreneurs in India and the 
Philippines are able to compensate to some extent for deficits in the business environment 
by using mutual aid and action: to some degree, they exchange funding and knowledge, 
convinced that cooperation pays off in the long run. In contrast, in Egypt entrepreneurs are 
much more reluctant to invest in, and rely on, their personal and professional networks. 
This does not mean at all that people in Egypt are different from those in India and the 
Philippines. Rather, the framework conditions do not reward joint action. Whereas 
entrepreneurs in India and the Philippines have apparently learnt that they can benefit 
from investments in social capital, many of those in Egypt explain that they have had (or 
heard much about) bad experiences with the provision of mutual support (e.g. partners 
have not paid back what they were given). In the end, the behaviour of entrepreneurs in 
Egypt is due to deficits in the rule of law: in Egypt, legal procedures are even more 
lengthy and unreliable than in India and the Philippines, with the effect that it is even more 
difficult for entrepreneurs to have their contracts enforced. 
5.1 The ICT sector in India and the challenge to access markets 
In the last three decades, India has developed an internationally competitive ICT sector. 
With the improvement of the information technology and telecommunication 
infrastructure, as well as the supply of educated manpower through the establishment of 
the Indian Institutes of Technology, many foreign and multinational companies were 
attracted to offshore and outsource software services in several Indian cities, such as 
Mumbai and Bangalore. In particular, the practice of sending Indian ICT professionals to 
the United States to work on assigned projects (also called “body shopping”) within 
multinational subsidiaries led to the development of an ICT diaspora, which has gained 
substantial exposure in developing technical, industry as well as domain experience. Due 
to low initial investment costs, the ICT service industry provided opportunities for first-
generation entrepreneurs to start their own small companies. Yet, a major challenge for 
ICT start-ups is access to profitable markets. Many segments of the Indian ICT market are 
still too small to allow for MSEs to access a reliable base of clients and buyers. Most 
public organisations and larger companies buy reputed international products, whereas 
smaller companies prefer low-cost providers. Thus, breaking into the more profitable 
domestic markets as a smaller “no-name” IT start-up without having a direct linkage is 
quite challenging. 
Upgraders had to compensate for the lack of accessible domestic market opportunities by 
developing two main coping strategies: either accessing international business (i) directly, 
or (ii) by establishing entry to the very few profitable business opportunities in the 
national market. For these strategies to unfold, upgraders initially used factors at the 
entrepreneur, personal network and professional network layers. At a later stage, factors 
associated with the enterprise layer were added.  
These factors were most prominently the entrepreneurs’ quality education at reputable 
graduate schools, their subsequent work exposure in international lead firms as well as 
their ability to instrumentalise personal as well as professional networks to gain market 
access. Indeed, most upgraders knew their international clients before starting their 
enterprises. This is because entrepreneurs build strong informal networks while employed 
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in international lead firms. Also, whether initial clients were located in India or abroad 
was irrelevant. However, the strategic decision to initially focus on one or two strategic 
partners helped small enterprises to build stronger reputations. With these strategic 
partners, upgraders reported gaining crucial learning experiences that helped their firms. 
Above all, the strong cooperation with lead firms allowed micro and small ICT companies 
to become more visible to other market participants.  
Further, with the development of stronger market visibility, upgraders started to invest in 
more professionalised in-house market research, marketing and sales. Thus, at this point, 
factors at the enterprise level became instrumental to broaden market coverage and to 
expand the business beyond the established base of clients. However, personal networks 
were reported to have remained the main marketing channels for extending the client base. 
Yet, extending the client and market bases was not random, but rather selective and 
strategic, in particular for companies aiming at adding value to their services. Upgraders 
who had a software development focus were quite choosy about their clients, as the 
coherence and strategy positioning of a product or service may have conflicted with the 
short-term need to customise certain activities. It seems that successful companies have 
rejected business or individual requests in order to save genuine software products from 
falling into the customisation trap, instead of having it become a scalable, sellable and 
thereby profitable product. Following this approach, software product companies aimed at 
establishing visibility in one or two domains (finance, energy). In contrast, ICT service-
oriented companies adopted strategies to scale-up business by entering as many domains 
as possible. 
5.2 The food processing sector in the Philippines and the challenge to get well-
educated and skilled workers 
Philippine food manufacturing – including the food processing sector – is the country’s 
biggest industry. In 2009, the industry accounted for around 40 per cent of total 
manufacturing output, represented a gross value added of more than US$ 2 billion and 
exhibited an annual growth rate of 9.7 per cent from 1999 to 2003, with processed fruits 
such as mangoes, bananas and pineapple contributing the biggest share in processed food 
export at 32.7 per cent.  
A common challenge for food processors is the lack of educated and skilled workers. 
Although food processors would prefer more highly educated or skilled employees, most 
of their workers are either primary or secondary school graduates who do not possess the 
relevant training. To overcome this constraint and increase their chances of success in 
upgrading, entrepreneurs use a combination of factors that encompass several layers of the 
Onion Model. Their most intensive efforts appear to focus on the first three layers of the 
model – investing in themselves and HRD for their employees first, then reaching out to 
their networks later.  
Although some of the entrepreneurs had food processing degrees, many did not. Thus, at 
the level of entrepreneur characteristics, the owner prioritises learning the skills of the 
trade or improving his existing knowledge. A common undertaking of all upgraded 
entrepreneurs is to frequently participate in seminars and short-term courses to update 
their previous learning and skills. Investing in learning allows the entrepreneur to 
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effectively lead production and innovation, but also to replace an employee and use one’s 
own labour when necessary. Furthermore, at the enterprise level, as a strategy to hedge 
against the lack of available skilled workers in the labour market, entrepreneurs were 
found to send their key employees to trainings as well as involve them in operational, 
technical and planning activities within the firm. At the networks level, entrepreneurs were 
found to frequently tap into personal and professional networks to overcome labour 
constraints. Family members, as part of the personal network, are the usual source of 
unpaid labour until skilled workers are found or replaced. Moreover, since they 
technically operate within the same sector, upgraders commonly contact other 
professional networks for referrals on qualified former employees to take in. Professional 
networks (including networks from within the government) have also been tapped for 
information on the different kinds of employee skills-training on offer from both public 
and private agencies.  
Finally, as a strategy at the enterprise level, successful entrepreneurs were found to 
provide incentives to keep skilled workers in the company. Absorbing monthly costs such 
as social security and health insurances, providing benefits, being flexible during workers’ 
family emergencies and hosting social events in-house are measures that effectively 
limited the rapid turnover of skilled employees. 
5.3 The textile and garments sector in Egypt and the challenge to access finance 
The textiles and garments industry is one of the oldest manufacturing sectors in Egypt and 
continues to be one of the most important ones. Textile production started early in the 20th 
century when Egypt was still controlled by the United Kingdom. It benefitted from cheap 
labour, proximity to European and Asian markets and the outstanding quality of Egyptian 
cotton. These production advantages still play a role, but the competition from East and South 
Asia has become very tough because labour productivity is much higher in these regions 
compared to Egypt. Nevertheless, textiles and garments accounted for 27 per cent of Egypt’s 
total industrial output and 14 per cent of all non-petroleum exports in 2008, and 76 per cent of 
all producers were MSEs (CAPMAS 2009; Oxford Business Group 2012, 118). 
The main concern for MSEs in the textiles and garments sector is access to finance – much 
more than in the other sectors studied (food processing and ICT). This holds true in 
particular for textile producers, which need comparatively expensive machines. The 
business environment (outer layer of the onion portrayed in Figure 1) fails to provide 
adequate credit and venture capital to the majority of MSEs. One reason is that the Egyptian 
banking system is rigid and underdeveloped. The level of competition is still low, with just a 
few large lending institutions dominating the sector. In addition, banks are extremely 
cautious – they prefer to lend to the government or large companies rather than to MSEs. 
Also, bank employees are not well trained to assess the business plans of MSEs; instead, 
they require levels of collateral that most MSE owners cannot provide (Loewe et al. 2013, 
154–161).  
But much of the problem lies also on the demand side. Many MSE owners are afraid of 
taking a loan (because they might not be able to pay it back) or they refuse to pay interest 
in general. Others do not know how to apply for credit or to fill in credit request forms, 
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whereas others are unable to provide financial documentation about their businesses or a 
proper business plan. 
Egyptian MSEs must resort to other sources of funding. But, in contrast to their Indian and 
Philippine peers, only a few are granted credit from their customers or suppliers (i.e. from 
the professional networks layer of our Onion Model), and hardly any take up informal 
loans from friends, neighbours or relatives (i.e. from the personal networks layer). This is 
symptomatic of the coping strategies of Egyptian MSEs in general, which very rarely tap 
their social or business networks for mastering any of the challenges displayed in Figure 3 
(finance, labour, markets, technology, security). The reason is the low level of mutual trust 
between companies and individuals in Egypt. MSEs are very reluctant to cooperate in any 
way because it is very difficult to enforce contracts – for example, to reclaim a loan. Many 
have had bad experiences in this regard, as legal procedures tend be lengthy and arbitrary. 
Deficits in the rule of law are, hence, once more the root of the problem. 
So how do Egyptian entrepreneurs overcome the challenge of the lack of access to 
finance? Some MSE owners tap informal sources of credit, such as, for example, money 
lenders, but they have to pay considerable interest rates. The bulk of MSEs have no access 
to finance besides their own funds (i.e. from the core of our Onion Model) – with the 
result that more affluent MSE owners have greater upgrading potential. Many textile 
producers can therefore only survive because they have inherited a factory from their 
fathers or grandfathers and can still use the old machinery. Especially in traditional 
clusters of textile production, many of the engines date back to the 1920s and 1930s. But 
when these break down, only the more affluent entrepreneurs can afford new ones. Start-
ups have hardly any chance to establish themselves in the textiles sector unless they have 
an alternative source of finance (e.g. another enterprise in a different sector) from which 
they can cover the necessary investments. 
6 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This paper set out to explore why upgrading seems to be difficult for micro and small 
enterprises in many low- and middle-income countries and to identify “success factors” 
that explain why some MSEs manage to upgrade despite the general difficulties. To this 
end, we employed the four-layer Onion Model, which systemises entrepreneur and 
enterprise characteristics, personal and professional networks, and the business 
environment, for investigating upgrading dynamics in Egypt, India and the Philippines.  
Despite apparent differences in the framework conditions among MSEs, our findings 
manifest a high degree of consistency across three countries. We found that micro and 
small enterprises in Egypt, India and the Philippines are confronted with very similar 
constraints to upgrading and yet, despite all identified constraints, upgrading is still 
possible for some of them. The likelihood to upgrade is higher for businesses where the 
entrepreneur is better endowed with human capital; has higher motivation and risk-taking 
ability; is willing to invest in human resource development, R&D and market research; 
and possesses personal wealth or easy access to family finance. Integration of the 
enterprise into global value chains also seems to increase upgrading likelihood. We found 
that enterprise upgrading is made possible when entrepreneurs develop strategies from a 
combination of success factors that allow them to simultaneously overcome a range of 
challenges. Although the exact combination of factors strongly depends on the 
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entrepreneurs’ contexts due to sector- and country specificities, our research provides 
evidence that the cornerstones of these factor combinations are based on entrepreneurial 
characteristics. Most key success factors that we found are entrepreneur characteristics, 
which are at the core of the Onion Model, and most others are contingent on 
entrepreneurial characteristics as well. This points us to our last finding – that there exists 
an evident inequality of opportunity for MSEs to upgrade, because the fundamental 
requirements for overcoming upgrading constraints are unequally distributed across the 
population.  
Thus, the three country studies have led us to conclude that the entrepreneur matters much 
more than what recent literature would lead us to believe. As a consequence, even if 
governments continue to improve the business environment, this does not automatically 
translate into success for a large number of MSEs. There is no question that the business 
environment is also important, but inequality of opportunity is going to prevail as long as 
governments are unable or unwilling to compensate actively for the uneven distribution of 
financial, human and social capital through the provision of quality education, quality 
training, and access to finance and market information for all. Unless governments address 
these structural issues, the number of upgraders will remain limited and the problem of the 
missing middle will prevail. Efforts to improve the business environment should be 
continued, but for MSE upgrading, the following policy directions that aim to create a 
level playing field may be even more important: 
Education. Public education systems must be overhauled in a way that they promote 
creativity, imagination, analytical abilities, critical thinking and other skills needed for 
entrepreneurship. One way to achieve this is to promote basic primary schooling as 
fundamental entrepreneurship policy. Without basic primary education, individuals will face 
strong entry barriers to starting and running an enterprise later on. Moreover, at higher 
education levels, the coverage of vocational training programmes should be extended. 
Governments should raise awareness among entrepreneurs about the importance of human 
resource development. 
Work experience. Prior to starting or taking over a business, industry exposure is critical 
for entrepreneurial success. Programmes that expose exceptional university graduates and 
high-performance employees to entrepreneurship training can therefore tap into a very 
fruitful source of entrepreneurship experience. Also, regarding loan applications, former 
industry credentials should play a crucial role in supporting the business case. 
Human resource development. Governments should consider supporting firms in 
providing on-the-job training to their workers and raising entrepreneurs’ awareness of the 
importance of human resource development (for example, workers’ training, 
improvements in labour conditions, non-wage benefits, participation of workers in 
decision-building) as a means to gain worker loyalty towards a firm. 
Access to markets. Policy-makers are encouraged to make information on local and foreign 
markets available to all MSEs and help them to link with larger domestic and foreign firms. 
Enabling MSEs to participate in established fairs or market their services in local and 
national media will help in overcoming the lack of visibility that most MSEs suffer from. 
Access to finance. Governments should encourage banks to provide more credit to MSEs 
and improve the financial literacy of MSE owners with an eye towards strengthening their 
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capacities to apply for credit. Incentivising bankers to develop targeted financial products 
for “opportunity” and “necessity” entrepreneurs is another strategy. Moreover, in order to 
improve the quality of financial services, it is necessary to improve the local information 
and knowledge infrastructure of banks assisting MSEs. Industry associations might play an 
important role in facilitating know-how on trends and business opportunities for financial 
institutions. 
Rule of law. Governments should enhance the rule of law by strengthening the 
accountability of public sector employees and the provision of incentives for better 
compliance by everybody with existing laws and regulations. 
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